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TEXT OF 8TATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109 (1953 as amended) provides: 
41-1-109. Unlawful control over vehicles— 
Penalties—Effect of prior consent—Accessory or 
accomplice. 
(1) Any person who exercises unauthorized 
control over a vehicle, not his own, without the 
consent of the owner or lawful custodian and with 
intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful 
custodian of possession of the vehicle, is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) Any offense under this section is a 
third degree felony if the actor does not return the 
vehicle to the owner or lawful custodian within 24 
hours after the exercise of unauthorized control. 
(3) The consent of the owner or legal 
custodian of a vehicle to its control by the actor 
is not in any case presumed or implied because of 
the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a 
previous occasion to the control of the vehicle by 
the same or a different person. 
(4) Any person who assists in, or is a party 
or accessory to or an accomplice in, an unauthorized 
taking or driving is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (1953 as amended) provides: 
41-1-112. Receiving or transferring stolen vehicle 
a felony. 
Any person who, with intent to procure or 
pass title to a vehicle which he knows or has reason 
to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken, 
receives, or transfers possession of the same from 
or to another, or who has in his possession any 
vehicle which he knows or has reason to believe has 
been stolen or unlawfully taken, and who is not an 
officer of the law engaged at the time in the 
performance of his duty as such officer, is guilty 
of a felony. 
iv 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
RONALD W. BASFORD, : Case No. 890281-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. In this case, the Honorable 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt lake County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment and 
conviction against Mr. Basford for "Possession of a Stolen Vehicle," 
a third degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial court err in convicting Mr. Basford of 
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112? 
(a) Was there sufficient evidence to convict 
Appellant of Possession of a Stolen Vehicle? 
(b) Did the trial court err in failing to set aside 
the greater offense under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 and 
convict Appellant of the lesser offense under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-1-109? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (1953 as amended). The trial judge 
found Mr. Basford guilty after a bench trial on stipulated facts 
held on March 9, 1989, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, presiding. 
The trial court sentenced Mr. Basford to a term of zero to 
five years at the Utah State Prison; the court stayed the prison 
sentence and placed Appellant on probation (R. 90). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 30, 1988, Officer Cutler of the Sandy City 
Police Department arrested Ronald Basford. Mr. Basford was 
subsequently charged with Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (1953 as amended), and 
Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal or Command, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1953 as amended). 
On February 16, 1989, Mr. Basford pled guilty to the charge 
of Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal or Command and 
submitted the charge of Possession of a Stolen Vehicle to the court 
in a bench trial on stipulated facts (R. 29; Transcript of 
- 2 
February 16, 1989 at 1, 9-10). Those stipulated facts are: 
1. That on September 29, 1988, Mr. Ken McAffee 
parked his 1983 Ford pickup truck on the street in Salt 
Lake County. 
2. That on September 29, 1988, at approximately 
9:00 p.m., some person took the truck and that no person 
had permission to take the vehicle. 
3. That on September 30, 1988, at 1:00 a.m., 
Officer A. Tim Cutler of the Sandy Police Department 
observed the Defendant, Ronald W. Basford, driving 
Mr. McAffee's 1983 Ford pickup in Sandy, Utah. 
4. That Officer Cutler attempted to stop the 
Defendant, Ronald W. Basford, but that the Defendant 
attempted to flee. 
5. That Mr. Basford was eventually stopped and 
arrested. 
6. That Mr. Basford would testify that on 
September 30, 1988, he was in possession of Mr. McAffee's 
car at a time when he knew that the car had been unlawfully 
taken and, further, that it was intent to abandon the 
vehicle that night near the area from which it had been 
taken. 
(R. 27-8). See Addendum A. As part of the submission, defense 
counsel argued that Mr. Basford should be found guilty of Joy 
Riding, a class A misdemeanor, and not the greater offense, 
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, a third degree felony (R. 29). 
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The trial judge found Mr. Basford guilty of "Possession of 
a Stolen Vehicle," a third degree felony (R. 90; Transcript of 
March 9, 1989, hereinafter "T", at 12). After oral argument, the 
judge read into the record a memorandum decision he had prepared 
prior to oral argument, based on the memoranda previously prepared 
by the parties (T. 9-13, R. 86-9). See Addendum B for trial judge's 
ruling. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There was insufficient evidence to establish that 
Mr. Basford was guilty of the crime of Possession of a Stolen 
Vehicle. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112, when read in conjunction with 
case law, seems to require an intent to permanently deprive the 
owner of a motor vehicle. The stipulated facts in this case fail to 
establish that Mr. Basford had such a permanent intent. 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court follows the literal 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 and requires only that a 
defendant have knowledge or belief that a vehicle was unlawfully 
taken in order to be guilty under that statute, the elements 
required under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109 are identical to those 
under § 41-1-112 under the circumstances of this case. The trial 
court therefore should have convicted Mr. Basford under Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-1-109 because a lesser penalty is available under that 
section. 
Furthermore, where a defendant is precluded from returning 
the vehicle because he is arrested within twenty-four hours of the 
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vehicle being taken and such defendant intended to return the 
vehicle to the vicinity from which it was taken, such defendant has 
committed a class A misdemeanor rather than a third degree felony 
under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING 
APPELLANT OF POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1-112. 
A. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT 
MR. BASFORD OF POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE. 
Due process requires that the state prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every element of the offense charged. 
State v. Cox, 751 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 1988), citing Patterson v. 
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2327, 53 L.Ed.2d 287 
(1977). Where a defendant claims on appeal that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish one or more elements of the crime 
for which he was convicted, the standard of review differs depending 
on whether the case was tried to the bench or to a jury. See 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-3 (Utah 1987). Where a case is 
tried to the bench, this Court must set aside the findings or 
verdict where they are against the clear weight of evidence, or if 
this Court otherwise "reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made . . . ." Id. at 193.1 
1
 When an appellate court in this state reviews the 
sufficiency of evidence in a case tried to a jury, the court will 
overturn the verdict "only when the evidence is so lacking and 
(continued) 
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In the present case, the trial judge convicted Mr. Basford of 
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (1953 
as amended) rather than joy riding as outlined in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-1-109 (1953 as amended). Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 provides: 
Receiving or Transferring Stolen Vehicle a Felony. 
Any person who with intent to procure or pass 
title to a vehicle which he knows or has reason to 
believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken, 
receives or transfers possession of the same from 
one to another, or who has in his possession any 
vehicle which he knows or has reason to believe has 
been stolen or unlawfully taken, and who is not an 
officer of the law engaged at the time in the 
performance of his duty as such officer, is guilty 
of a felony. 
As the title of the statute indicates, this statute focuses 
on the transfer and receipt of stolen vehicles. The first portion 
of the statute, ending with the word "another," clearly requires an 
intent to procure or pass title coupled with the receipt or transfer 
of possession of the vehicle. Whether the intent to procure or pass 
title is also required for the second portion of the statute, the 
portion applicable to the present case, is less clear. However, the 
title of the statute, the use of the word "stolen" and case law 
(footnote 1 continued) 
insubstantial that a reasonable person could not have reached that 
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 192, quoting State v. 
Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555, 557 (Utah 1985); State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 
539, 550 (Utah 1983); State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 
1983). In other words, the tremendous deference given a jury 
verdict is not applicable where a case is tried to the bench. 
Furthermore, because this case was tried on stipulated facts, the 
trial court did not assess demeanor of witnesses or arguably believe 
one witness over another. This court is presented with evidence 
identical to that placed before the trial court and is in the unique 
position of being able to review in toto the decision of the trial 
court. 
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§ 41-1-112. In light of Levin and Porter. it appears that the 
statute is not aimed at persons v/ho intend to temporarily deprive an 
owner of his vehicle; instead, it is aimed at those who intend to 
permanently deprive an owner of his vehicle and to trade in such 
stolen vehicles. 
In Larocco, where the defendant was convicted of Possession 
of a Stolen Vehicle under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112, the defendant 
had possessed the vehicle for a significant amount of time and had 
registered it in his name. Larocco, 742 P.2d at 92. In Tuggle, the 
defendant transferred title to the stolen vehicle. Tuggle, 501 P.2d 
at 637. Therefore, a permanent intent to deprive the owner of the 
vehicle was present in these cases.2 
In the present case, it is unclear whether the trial judge 
required an intent to permanently deprive in reaching his decision 
to convict Mr. Basford under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112. Prior to 
the hearing, the trial judge had prepared a Memorandum Decision 
which he read into the record after defense counsel failed to 
convince him during oral argument that the decision was incorrect. 
The judge's comments and the Memorandum Decision are contained in 
Addendum B. 
As part of the Memorandum Decision, the trial court stated: 
The Court finds that the acts of the defendant fall 
within section 41-1-112 Utah Code Annotated. That 
2
 The fourth case found in the annotations, State v. 
Butterfield, 261 P. 804 (Utah 1927), was actually decided prior to 
the enactment of the statute and dealt with the issue of whether the 
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice was sufficient to sustain 
the conviction. 
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Mr, Basford (R. 27). The facts also establish that Mr. Basford 
intended to "abandon the vehicle that night near the area from which 
it had been taken" (R. 28). Regardless of whether this intent to 
leave the truck near the area from which it had been taken fits 
within the confines of the requirement of Utah Code Ann, 
§ 41-1-109(2) that the vehicle be returned to the owner for the 
crime to qualify as a misdemeanor, it nevertheless establishes only 
an intent to temporarily deprive as opposed to a permanent intent. 
The short period of time that the vehicle was missing and 
Mr. Basford7s intent to return it to the area from which it was 
taken are in contrast to the facts of other cases where a defendant 
has been convicted under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112. See Levin, 587 
P.2d at 125, 126 (vehicle missing two days, tampered with so that it 
could be started without a key, defendant in possession of tools to 
enable him to start vehicle); Larocco, 742 P.2d at 90 (car stolen 
several years before, parked at defendant's home for number of days 
and registered to defendant); Tuggle, 501 P.2d at 637 (title 
transferred by defendant to lending institution); Porter, 502 P.2d 
at 1148 (purpose of statute to prevent stealing and trafficking of 
stolen motor vehicles). 
In addition to focusing on the defendant's failure to 
return the vehicle directly to its owner within twenty-four hours, 
the trial judge focused on Mr. Basford's flight when the officer 
attempted to stop him as evidence that Mr. Basford was guilty of 
this particular crime. Various courts, including the Utah Supreme 
Court, have acknowledged that flight does not necessarily mean that 
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Court. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE 
THE GREATER OFFENSE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1-112 
AND CONVICT MR. BASFORD UNDER THE LESSER JOY RIDING 
STATUTE. 
When read literally, Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (1953 as 
amended) requires only that an individual in possession of a vehicle 
know or have reason to believe that the vehicle was "unlawfully 
taken" in order to be guilty of the crime charged under that statute. 
At trial, defense counsel argued that the charges of 
joy riding, as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109 (1953 as 
amended), and Receiving a Stolen Vehicle, as outlined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-1-112 (1953 as amended), contain identical elements in the 
context of this case. Defense counsel pointed out that, according 
to the State, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 occurs where 
a defendant is in possession of a vehicle he knew to have been 
unlawfully taken, and that in any joy riding, including the instant 
case, those elements are present (T. 7). 
The State responded, arguing that since defendant only 
intended to abandon the vehicle in the area from which it was taken 
and not to return it directly to its owner, the appropriate charge 
was Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (T. 7-8).3 
Assuming, arguendo, that the statute requires only that the 
defendant know or have reason to believe that the vehicle was 
unlawfully taken (and not that he have an intent to permanently 
3
 The statute actually gives a defendant a greater penalty 
where he fails to return the vehicle within twenty-four hours, but 
does not make return to the owner an element of the crime of 
joy riding. Intent to temporarily deprive an owner is the key to 
the joy riding statute, not the return of the vehicle. 
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See also State v. ^oveic < ) 
(aggravated sexual, assault statute and version of rape statute Mien 
in effect proscribe identical conduct and defendant entitled to 
lesser penalty of rape statute). 
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In State v. Levin, the defendant argued that under Shondel 
and its progeny, he should have been convicted under the joy riding 
statute (Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109) rather than Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-1-112. On its face, the argument in Levin is identical to the 
argument in the instant case; however, the facts in Levin differ 
significantly from those in the instant case, making the holding in 
Levin that the defendant was not entitled to the joy riding penalty 
inapplicable. 
In Levin, the facts did not support the conclusion that the 
vehicle was taken temporarily because the car was missing for two 
days and the lock cylinder had besen removed so that the vehicle 
could be driven without a key. Levin, 587 P.2d at 126. Hence, the 
defendant had an intent to permanently deprive and the version of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 under which the defendant was convicted in 
Levin required that the defendant be in possession of a vehicle he 
knew or had reason to believe had been stolen. 
By contrast, the only version of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 
applicable to the facts in the instant case is a literal reading of 
the version requiring that the defendant be in possession of a 
vehicle he knew or had reason to believe was unlawfully taken. Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-1-109 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Any person who exercises unauthorized 
control over a vehicle, not his own, without the 
consent of the owner or lawful custodian and with 
intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lciwful 
custodian of possession of the vehicle, is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) An offense under this section is a third 
degree felony if the actor does not return the 
vehicle to the owner or lawful custodian within 24 
hours after the exercise of unauthorized control. 
- 14 -
Jn ar\ 'o- idinq the defendant h,i^ in h is possession a 
vehicle which t^ k*v>w ^ P ^ O " ** • brieve was unlawful 1 y 
taken. . L - \t:. . sat. - D 
the facts r this case i wholly duplicative ot trie elements cf Utah 
Code Ann. • -rpellant was entitled to the lesser 
penaltv r . t^ . - . . . 
As i '~rial «":*» polrted out 'efendant who does not 
return erucie w i u u n twenty * **•* K ^r - ruilty of * thi rd 
degree .^ony rather than a Tn.---meai.-i, - .. .:? ca ] t:. :: > the 
renalt. under I tah <.*ode An; Jl-l-lW, Nevertheless, because of 
%?s~er penalty -;^der rTtah Code Anr 41-1-109, 
Lae L^^Ui ~, ._*-<. o.*^^.- ;.aVt proceeaea an-iv.-: '.;;.• 
:: do; ' ; t- stipulated facts or th,s case establish 
* *
s< *, J t "*• . ')fis were a misdemeanor * -nder ''•'ah Code mui. 
. .j. laUic, *wo. . ;elony ^he detenaant was stepped by 
officers roui arc aft-.* the vehicle was taken •<. 2* He 
face, :ne misdemeanor was applicable since Mre Basford *<x*> precluded 
f ror. return : n < - - n :.„ . v-
;-4 .*> ' r ' ^asford 
intended . JLLOHU^. * ;a*- vehicle that, n^ght near the diua ir^n, *r,,ch 
it was taker * 4-.t'. i, J J strict read in ! • ne statute 
4
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-] -1 12 was amended effective 
April 24, 1989 to make the crime charged under s VL-1-1I2 a second 
degree felony 
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such an interpretation precludes the class A misdemeanor joy riding 
charge from ever being used since it would be a rare individual who 
would take a vehicle, joy ride in it, then take it to the owner's 
home, and ring the doorbell or otherwise seek out the owner in order 
to return the vehicle. Instead, a practical reading of the 
twenty-four hour requirement is that the vehicle be left in the 
vicinity from which it was taken so that the owner can easily 
retrieve it. In practice, joy riding is generally charged where 
there was an intent to temporarily deprive; the twenty-four hour 
lesser penalty provision is used where a vehicle is not damaged or 
altered and returned within twenty-four hours to the place from 
which it was taken. 
In this case, the vehicle was not altered or damaged, 
Defendant intended to leave it near the place from which it was 
taken, and it apparently was returned to the owner within 
twenty-four hours. The lesser class A penalty should be applicable 
in this case. 
The trial court erred in convicting Mr. Basford under Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-1-112. Appellant respectfully requests that the 
conviction be reversed and the case remanded with an order that he 
be convicted of Joy Riding, a class A misdemeanor. 
- 16 -
CONCLUSION 
Appellar1" respectful 1 y requests that this Court .reverse his 
'..-... J:\ una* tah Code ii! i 11 i § id ei 1 ter a < "urn ' ict; i n in 
tor Joy Riding * class A misdemeanor 
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Respectfully submitted this - day of March, 1990. 
ZjAMfiS C. BRADSHAW 
Attorney for Defendant 'Appellant 
\ 
^^tu)gzf 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF" PELT * '^RY 
I, JOAN C. WATT hereby certify thai1 eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
M i d i - o w n P l a z a '" u'l : . r it In '" i i K n s t Sf t l r t i .nki i i t < « tifniirii H 4 1 f")." a n d 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this %7 day of March, 1990. 
~<^$^C*gjeu4 
JOAN C- WATT 
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this day of March, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM A 
JAMES BRADSHAW, (#3768) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
miss owf j*iir csiru 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 1 6 1989 
S»wT*LA*5:O^Hi fY 
** Deplete* 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RONALD W. BASFORD 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION 
Case No. 881991522 
HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON 
The defendant, RONALD W. BASFORD, his attorney, JAMES C. 
BRADSHAW and the state through, Deputy County Attorney, ERNIE JONES, 
do hereby stipulate to the following facts: 
1. That on September 29, 1988 Mr. Ken McAffee parked his 
1983 Ford pickup truck on the street in Salt Lake County. 
2. That on September 29, 1988 at approximately 9:00 p.m. 
some person took the truck and that no person had permission to take 
the vehicle. 
3. That on September 30, 1988 at 1:00 a.m. Officer 
H. M. Cutler of the Sandy Police Department observed the defendant, 
RONALD W. BASFORD, driving Mr. McAffeefs 1983 Ford pickup in Sandy 
Utah. 
4. That Officer Cutler attempted to stop the defendant, 
RONALD W. BASFORD, but that the defendant attempted to flee. 
5. That Mr. Basford was eventually stopped and arrested, 
6. That Mr. Basford would testify that on September 30, 
1988 he was in possession of Mr. McAffee's car at a time when he 
knew that the car had been unlawfully taken and further, that it was 
his intent to abandon the vehicle that night near the area from 
which it had been taken. 
DATED this day of February, 1989. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 




Deputy Coun/y Attorney 
JAifES CT BRADSHAW 
:orney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
the Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 , this J£ A day of February, 1989. 
ADDENDUM B 
defendant's testimony would be that, in fact, it was his 
intent to return the vehicle. 
THE COURT: I have dictated a memorandum 
decision. I did it yesterday afternoon, subject to being 
changed if oral argument were to change my mind. I am 
now signing this because my decision remains. And since 
I have made a memorandum decision, in civil matters we 
always mail these and in criminal matters I know the 
defendant must be here, I am going to simply read it so 
that we don't have me speaking on the record orally and 
something else written in the memorandum decision. 
"Defendant Basford has been charged with the 
crime of Possession of a Stolen Vehicle a third degree 
felony. Defendant admits that he was in possession of 
the victim's vehicle but that the facts dictate that he 
should have been charged under Section 41-1-109, Utah 
Code Annotated, the joyriding statute. 
"The State and the defendant have submitted the 
matter to the Court on stipulated facts. The State and 
the defendant and defendant's counsel have stipulated in 
writing to applicable facts and have stipulated that the 
Court decide guilt or innocence based upon the 
stipulation and applicable law. The defendant has waived 
his right to trial by jury, and has stipulated to the 
said procedure. 
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1 "The stipulation sets forth the following 
2 essential facts: No. 1: That the victim's truck was 
3 taken by some person without permission on September 29, 
4 1988, at about 9:00 p.m. 
5 "No. 2: That the police observed defendant 
6 Basford driving the said truck some four hours later on 
7 September 30, 1988, at about 1:00 a.m. 
8 "No. 3: The police attempted to stop the 
9 defendant; however, the defendant attempted to flee. 
10 "No. 4: That defendant was eventually 
11 apprehended and arrested. 
12 "No. 5: That Basford would testify that he 
13 knew the vehicle was unlawfully taken and that it was his 
14 intent to abandon the vehicle that night near the area 
15 from which it had been taken. 
16 "For one to be guilty of depriving an owner of 
17 a vehicle, that is joyriding, what we commonly call the 
18 joyriding statute, he has to have exercised unauthorized 
19 control over a vehicle which is not his own, and to have 
20 done so with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner 
21 of possession. If such be the case such defendant would 
22 be guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Furthermore, if he 
23 did not return the vehicle to the owner within 24 hours, 
24 the crime then becomes a third degree felony. To be 
25 guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle, one has to have 
been in possession of a vehicle which he knew or had 
reason to know had been stolen or unlawfully taken. 
"In this case, defendant knew the vehicle had 
been taken without authorization and was in possession at 
the time with this knowledge and when observing the 
police, attempted to flee from the police. At this point 
he was subject to Section 41-1-112 Utah Code Annotated. 
The actions of the defendant in attempting to flee the 
police are not indicative of intent to only temporarily 
deprive the owner of his property. 
"The defendant claims he intended to abandon 
the said vehicle, is not the same as returning the 
vehicle to the owner within 24 hours under Section 41-1-
109 Code Annotated. That statute requires the actor to 
return the vehicle to the owner within 24 hours or suffer 
the said crime to be a third degree felony. Under either 
statute the defendant would be guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
"The Court finds that the acts of the defendant 
fall within Section 41-1-112 Utah Code Annotated. That 
the elements of that crime differ from the elements of 
the crime in Section 41-1-109. That the facts stipulated 
to and the reasonable inferences thereof do not bring 
this matter within 41-1-109. The Court therefore, based 



























possession of a vehicle which he knew or had reason to 
know had been stolen or unlawfully taken in violation of 
Section 41-1-112." 
And the Court having so found the defendant 
guilty — 
MR. BRADSHAW: Your Honor, could I make an 
inquiry to the Court in regards to the Court's finding? 
THE COURT: I have read the decision. The 
argument has been made. The decision is here. You don't 
get to ask the jury. You don't get to question the jury. 
You put it on stipulated facts and I have made the 
decision. Right or wrong, it is made. 
MR. BRADSHAW: I certainly accept the Court's 
decision. I think there is one point of law that needs 
to be clarified, and would ask an opportunity since this 
is a purely legal matter that was submitted to the Court 
for a legal determination as to that point of law. 
THE COURT: What is the problem? 
MR. BRADSHAW: And that is as to the elements 
of the statute to which the defendant has been found 
guilty: 41-1-112. The Court, as I understand the 
Court's ruling, has found — 
THE COURT: Mr. Bradshaw, I have made my 
decision. It is a memorandum decision and if you want to 
file a motion, go ahead but then Mr. Jones can respond to 
12 
1 that- But I don't want to go any further with it. 
2 MR. BRADSHAW: If I could just be heard 
3 briefly. If this were a jury case, we would be entitled 
4 to know what elements were submitted to the jury and what 
5 the elements of that offense are. And I think in this 
6 case the question revolves around whether the defendant 
7 has an intent to permanently deprive or an intent to 
8 temporarily deprive. The statute 41-1-112 contains 
9 neither of those. If I understand the Court's ruling 
10 correctly, the Court is not finding that an intent to 
11 permanently deprive as an element of this offense? 
12 THE COURT: I am finding that there is no 
13 evidence that he intended to return and he doesn't come 
14 under that section. The fact that he fled from the 
15 police certainly shows no intent to return that to the 
16 owner, and the fact that he intended to abandon it, does 
17 not meet the requirements of that statute wherein the 
18 owner must return the vehicle. And I am finding that he 
19 is guilty of, I think it is 112, and the elements are set 
20 forth in that statute and he is in violation of those 
21 elements. And with that, I will say no more. 
22 MR. BRADSHAW: Thank you, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Okay, this matter is already set 
24 for sentencing on — 




































will submit this matter, i 
the slip has already been 
's just make sure of that date. 
3rd 
MR. 
, 1989, at : 
BRADSHAW: 
(End 
2:00 p.m. Okay. 
Thank you, Your 
of hearing.) 
* * * * 
Sentence 
Honor. 
request 
filled 
is set 
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